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Open market operations are the Federal Reserve’s
principal tool for implementing monetary policy.1
These purchases and sales of U.S. Treasury and fed-
eral agency securities largely determine the federal
funds rate—the interest rate at which depository insti-
tutions lend balances at the Federal Reserve to other
depository institutions overnight. The federal funds
rate, in turn, affects monetary and ﬁnancial condi-
tions, which ultimately inﬂuence employment, out-
put, and the overall level of prices.
The objectives and conduct of open market opera-
tions have evolved over the years, partly in response
to the way the Federal Open Market Committee—the
Federal Reserve’s primary monetary policymaking
body—implements policy and explains it to the pub-
lic. Also shaping the conduct of open market opera-
tions have been changes in ﬁnancial markets, includ-
ing a move to arrange transactions in the market for
repurchase agreements earlier in the day, prompted
by the Federal Reserve’s imposition of a fee on
daylight overdrafts in the accounts of depository
institutions. Another important inﬂuence has been a
decline in the balances that depository institutions are
required to hold at the Federal Reserve stemming
from the widespread adoption of retail sweep pro-
grams, which transfer funds from deposit accounts
that are subject to reserve requirements to deposit
accounts that are not.
FEDERAL RESERVE BALANCES
AND RESERVE OBJECTIVES
Open market operations are a powerful tool in imple-
menting monetary policy because of their connection
with the total supply of balances at the Federal
Reserve and the federal funds rate. Many depository
institutions maintain accounts at Federal Reserve
Banks that they use to make payments on behalf of
their customers or themselves. They use the end-of-
day balances in these accounts to meet reserve and
other balance requirements (See box ‘‘Reserve Con-
cepts, Technical Factors, and Required Clearing Bal-
ances.’’) If a depository institution anticipates that it
will end the day with a larger balance than it wants, it
can reduce that balance in several ways depending on
how long it expects the surplus to persist. For exam-
ple, if it expects the surplus to be temporary, the
institution often lends the excess balance overnight to
a depository institution that anticipates having a
smaller end-of-day balance than it wants. The market
in which the lending of Federal Reserve balances
takes place is the federal funds market, and the inter-
est rate at which the loan is made is the federal funds
rate.2 The total supply of Federal Reserve balances
available to depository institutions is determined pri-
marily by open market operations. Through these
operations, the Federal Reserve has considerable
inﬂuence over conditions in the federal funds market.
Open market operations can be directed at achiev-
ing a desired quantity of balances, as speciﬁed by the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), or a
desired price (federal funds rate), but they may not be
able to achieve both at once. The greater the empha-
sis on a quantity objective, the more short-run
changes in the demand for balances will inﬂuence the
federal funds rate; conversely, the greater the empha-
sis on a funds-rate objective, the more shifts in
demand will inﬂuence the quantity of Federal
Reserve balances.
Over the years, the Federal Reserve has used varia-
tions of both approaches to open market operations.3
1. The other tools of monetary policy are reserve requirements and
the discount window, the Federal Reserve’s lending facility. See
Joshua N. Feinman, ‘‘Reserve Requirements: History, Current Prac-
tice, and Potential Reform,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 79
(June 1993), pp. 569–89, and James A. Clouse, ‘‘Recent Develop-
ments in Discount Window Policy,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 80
(November 1994), pp. 965–77.
2. Federal funds lending is not collateralized; therefore, different
depository institutions pay different rates for loans depending on their
creditworthiness. Depository institutions can arrange transactions
directly between themselves, or for large transactions they can use a
federal funds broker. Typically, the term ‘‘federal funds rate’’ refers to
the rate at which the most creditworthy institutions borrow and lend
balances in the brokered market.
3. Detailed discussions of the history of monetary policy can be
found in Ann-Marie Meulendyke, U.S. Monetary Policy and Financial
Markets (New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1989),
pp. 18–47, and in Ann-Marie Meulendyke, ‘‘A Review of Federal
Reserve Policy Targets and Operating Guides in Recent Decades,’’
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, vol. 13
(Autumn 1988), pp. 6–17.
859During most of the 1970s, it targeted the federal
funds rate. In October 1979, at a time when anti-
inﬂationary restraint was called for, it began instead
to target the quantity of reserves—speciﬁcally, non-
borrowed reserves—to achieve greater control over
M1, the narrowest measure of the money stock.
Under this approach, market interest rates varied over
a wide range, mainly in response to deviations in M1
growth from the FOMC’s objective.
By late 1982, it had become clear that ﬁnancial
innovation had weakened the historical link between
M1 and the economic objectives of monetary policy,
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Reserve Concepts
Total reserves equal vault cash used by depository institu-
tions to meet reserve requirements (so-called applied vault
cash) plus reserve balances held by depository institutions
at their Federal Reserve Banks. Reserve balances, and thus
total reserves, exclude required clearing balances of deposi-
tory institutions.
Demand for Reserves
The demand for reserves has two components, required
reserves and excess reserves.
Required Reserves (RR). Each depository institution
must hold a percentage of certain of its deposit liabilities as
reserves. Reserve requirements are currently applied to the
average level of transaction deposits over a two-week com-
putation period and are speciﬁed as an average level to be
maintained over a two-week reserve maintenance period.1
A depository institution’s reserve requirement is satisﬁed
ﬁrst by its vault cash—currency held in its vault—and, if
vault cash is insufﬁcient, by the end-of-day balances it
maintains during the reserve maintenance period in its
account at its Federal Reserve Bank. Holding required
reserve balances—the difference between required reserves
and applied vault cash—is costly for a depository institution
because the Federal Reserve does not pay interest on these
balances.
Excess Reserves (ER). A depository institution may
choose to hold balances at its Federal Reserve Bank in
addition to those it must hold to meet reserve requirements;
these balances are called excess reserves. Depository insti-
tutions hold excess reserves to avoid deﬁciencies in their
required reserve balances and to avoid overnight overdrafts,
both of which are subject to charges. In general, depository
institutions hold few excess reserves because these holdings
do not earn interest. Most excess reserves are held by small
depository institutions for whom the cost of very close
management of reserve balances would exceed the interest
they could earn by holding fewer excess reserves. Vault
1. Approximately 99 percent of all required reserves are held by deposi-
tory institutions that meet their reserve requirements on a two-week average
basis. The computation and maintenance periods for these depository institu-
tions are nearly contemporaneous. Small depository institutions hold the
remaining required reserves. The computation and maintenance periods for
these institutions are one-week long, but there is a lag between the two
periods.
cash held in excess of reserve requirements is not included
in excess reserves or in total reserves.
Supply of Reserves
The supply of reserves has two components, borrowed
reserves and nonborrowed reserves.
Borrowed Reserves (BR). Borrowed reserves are bal-
ances provided to depository institutions through the Fed-
eral Reserve’s discount window lending facility. In general,
a depository institution is expected to use the discount
window to meet its liquidity needs only after drawing on all
other reasonably available sources of funds. This adminis-
trative criterion limits considerably the use of the window,
even though the rate charged for discount window loans—
the discount rate—is typically below the federal funds rate.
Since the mid-1980s, depository institutions have become
quite reluctant to turn to the discount window because of
concerns that their borrowing might become known to
private market participants—even though the Federal
Reserve treats the identity of borrowers in a highly conﬁ-
dential manner—and that such borrowing might be viewed
as a sign of weakness.2 As a result, the volume of balances
supplied through the discount window is generally a very
small fraction of the total supply of reserves.
Nonborrowed Reserves (NBR). Nonborrowed reserves
are reserves provided to depository institutions through
means other than the discount window and include applied
vault cash. Over time, nonborrowed reserves are affected
primarily by open market operations. They are also inﬂu-
enced by changes in technical factors (described below).
Although the Federal Reserve does not have complete con-
trol over technical factors, it can offset fairly closely their
effects on nonborrowed reserves through open market
operations, and thus it can exercise considerable control
over the supply of reserves.
In equation form, the reserve concepts are related as
follows:
TR = RR + ER = BR + NBR.
At equilibrium, the total demand for reserves must equal the
total supply of reserves.
2. See Clouse, ‘‘Recent Developments in Discount Window Policy.’’
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decisions about money market conditions, using a
wider array of economic and ﬁnancial variables to
judge the need for an adjustment in short-term inter-
est rates. In the day-to-day conduct of open market
operations, this change was manifested in a shift of
focus from a nonborrowed reserve target to a bor-
rowed reserve target. The Federal Reserve routinely
supplies fewer reserves than the estimated demand,
thus forcing depository institutions to meet their
remaining need for reserves by borrowing at the
discount window. The total amount borrowed is lim-
ited, however, even though the discount rate is gener-
ally below the federal funds rate, because access to
discount window credit is restricted. In particular,
depository institutions are required to pursue all other
reasonably available sources of funds, including those
available in the federal funds market, before credit is
granted. During the time it was targeting borrowed
reserves, the Federal Reserve inﬂuenced the level of
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Technical Factors
Affecting Nonborrowed Reserves
Technical factors are items on the Federal Reserve’s bal-
ance sheet other than loans and holdings of domestic securi-
ties that can affect the supply of nonborrowed reserves to
depository institutions.3 The key factors are described here.
Currency. The Federal Reserve supplies currency to
depository institutions. When it does so, it debits the Fed-
eral Reserve account of the depository institution receiving
the currency, thus draining reserve balances from the
depository system. The amount of currency demanded by
the public, both in the United States and abroad, tends to
grow over time, in part reﬂecting increases in nominal
spending. Consequently, an increasing volume of reserve
balances is drained from the depository system and must be
replenished. The expansion of currency outstanding is the
primary reason the Desk conducts outright purchases of
securities.
Treasury Balance. The U.S. Treasury maintains an
account at the Federal Reserve. When a payment is made to
the Treasury, the Federal Reserve account of the depository
institution on which the payment is drawn is debited, and
the Federal Reserve account of the Treasury is credited. The
Treasury is not a depository institution, so the transaction
drains reserve balances from the depository system. The
Treasury’s Federal Reserve balance is the most volatile
technical factor that affects nonborrowed reserves, espe-
cially in the weeks following the April 15 deadline for
federal income tax payments.
Federal Reserve Float. Federal Reserve ﬂoat is created
when the account of the depository institution presenting a
check for payment is credited before the account of the
depository institution on which the check is drawn is deb-
ited. This situation can arise because credit is granted to the
presenting depository institution on a preset schedule,
whereas the paying institution’s account is not debited until
3. A more detailed discussion of the factors affecting nonborrowed
reserves can be found in Ann-Marie Meulendyke, U.S. Monetary Policy and
Financial Markets, pp. 141–47.
the check is physically presented to it. Float temporarily
adds reserve balances to the depository system because,
until the paying institution’s account is debited, the two
depository institutions essentially are credited with the same
reserve balances. Float is most volatile following inclement
weather that disrupts the normal check-delivery process.
Foreign Exchange. When the Federal Reserve purchases
dollars, it does so by selling assets denominated in foreign
currencies. It debits the account of the purchaser of the
foreign currency asset (or the purchaser’s depository institu-
tion if the purchaser is not a depository institution) for the
dollar value of the transaction, so reserve balances decrease.
Conversely, when the Federal Reserve sells dollars, it pur-
chases assets denominated in foreign currencies. It credits
the account of the seller’s depository institution for the
dollar value of the transaction, and reserve balances
increase. The effects of these transactions on reserve bal-
ances are sterilized, or offset, by open market operations.
Required Clearing Balances
Depository institutions that use Federal Reserve priced ser-
vices (such as check clearing or electronic payment ser-
vices) may establish required clearing balances at their
Federal Reserve Banks. When a depository institution estab-
lishes a required clearing balance, it commits in advance
to holding a speciﬁed balance, above its required reserve
balance, on average over the reserve maintenance period.
Required clearing balances, like excess reserves, provide
a cushion against overnight overdrafts; unlike excess
reserves, however, required clearing balances earn implicit
interest, in the form of earnings credits. If the depository
institution fails to satisfy its required clearing balance, the
deﬁciency is subject to a charge.
Although they are excluded from reserve measures
because they cannot be used to meet reserve requirements,
required clearing balances play an important role in helping
depository institutions avoid overnight overdrafts. For the
Desk’s purposes, required clearing balances are included
in nonborrowed reserves as a technical factor absorbing
reserves.
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which depository institutions had to turn to the dis-
count window. When it wanted to ease monetary
policy, it would reduce the borrowed reserve target
and supply more nonborrowed reserves to meet esti-
mated demand. With less pressure to borrow from the
discount window, depository institutions would bid
less aggressively for reserve balances at the Federal
Reserve, and the federal funds rate would fall.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, spreading doubts
about the ﬁnancial health of some depository institu-
tions led to an increasing reluctance on the part of
many institutions to borrow at the discount window,
thus weakening the link between borrowing and the
federal funds rate.4 Consequently, the Federal
Reserve increasingly sought to attain a speciﬁc level
of the federal funds rate rather than a targeted quan-
tity of borrowed reserves.
In early 1994, the FOMC was preparing to tighten
monetary policy for the ﬁrst time in ﬁve years, and it
wanted the public to understand its objectives as
quickly and clearly as possible. For many years, the
FOMC did not announce changes in the stance of
monetary policy. Instead, market participants had to
infer changes from the type of open market operation
conducted and the level of the federal funds rate
relative to their perceptions about the FOMC’s target
rate. The perceived change would then be publicized
through wire service stories and other press accounts.
This means of communicating could, and on a few
occasions did, lead to misunderstandings about the
stance of policy or to delays in recognizing changes.
As a result, the FOMC in 1994 began announcing
changes in its policy stance, so that the public would
learn of any change immediately. In 1995, it sought
to make its announcements even clearer by explicitly
stating its short-term objective for open market opera-
tions, which is currently a target level for the federal
funds rate.
OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS: AN OVERVIEW
Open market operations affect the supply of Federal
Reserve balances to depository institutions. Purchases
of securities increase the quantity of Federal Reserve
balances because the Federal Reserve creates the
balances to pay the seller by crediting the account of
the seller’s depository institution at the Federal
Reserve. Conversely, sales of securities decrease the
quantity of Federal Reserve balances because the
Federal Reserve extinguishes balances when it debits
the account of the purchaser’s depository institution
at the Federal Reserve. In contrast, when ﬁnancial
institutions, business ﬁrms, or individuals conduct
transactions among themselves, they simply redistrib-
ute existing balances held at the Federal Reserve
without changing the aggregate level of those
balances.5
Domestic Securities Holdings
Open market operations are arranged by the Domes-
tic Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York (the Desk) under authorization from the
FOMC, which was created by statute to direct open
market operations. Operations are conducted in
domestic securities, primarily U.S. Treasury and
federal agency securities.6 Nearly all of the Federal
Reserve’s domestic securities holdings are Treasury
securities, with roughly equal shares of Treasury bills
and Treasury coupon securities—notes and bonds
(table 1). Federal agency securities have accounted
for only a small proportion of the domestic securities
portfolio since the Federal Reserve began purchasing
such securities in 1971. The Desk has not added to
the Federal Reserve’s permanent holdings of agency
securities through open market purchases since 1981;
moreover, when suitable replacements for maturing
issues have not been offered, the Desk has had to
allow existing holdings to mature without replace-
ment. As a result, the Federal Reserve’s holdings of
federal agency securities have declined steadily, and
recently the Desk stated that it will permit the remain-
der of these holdings to mature without replacement.
It continues, however, to acquire agency securities in
temporary operations, which are discussed below.
4. See Clouse, ‘‘Recent Developments in Discount Window Pol-
icy.’’ See also ‘‘Monetary Policy and Open Market Operations during
1988,’’ Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, vol. 14
(Winter–Spring 1989), pp. 83–102.
5. More detailed discussions of open market operations can be
found in Meulendyke, U.S. Monetary Policy and Financial Markets,
and in M.A. Akhtar, Understanding Open Market Operations
(New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1997).
6. The Desk is also authorized to conduct limited operations in
bankers’ acceptances, and it was very active in that market until 1977,
when the FOMC decided to discontinue outright purchases under
ordinary circumstances. Outright transactions in bankers’ acceptances
had not contributed materially to meeting reserve needs for a number
of years, and the FOMC noted that the market had become mature and
efﬁcient and no longer needed support from Federal Reserve opera-
tions. Similar motivations prompted the FOMC to discontinue tempo-
rary purchases of bankers’ acceptances in 1984.
The Federal Reserve also holds securities denominated in foreign
currencies. Purchases and sales of these securities are not considered
open market operations.
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of domestic securities is dictated by the FOMC’s
monetary policy objectives. The liquidity and matu-
rity of that portfolio depend on the FOMC’s prefer-
ences, which have evolved over time. In the early
1980s, the average maturity of the portfolio was
slightly more than four years, similar to the average
maturity of the public’s holdings of marketable U.S.
Treasury debt (table 2). In 1984, when Continental
Illinois National Bank faced a severe liquidity crisis,
emphasis on the liquidity of the portfolio increased
because the Desk had to offset the massive volume of
balances provided to Continental through the dis-
count window. The Federal Reserve was able to
maintain the desired level of reserve balances by
allowing Treasury bills to mature without replace-
ment and by selling them in a market that was recep-
tive to liquid short-term issues of the highest quality.
The crisis underscored the importance of having a
liquid portfolio, one that could accommodate devel-
opments requiring large cuts in holdings over a short
period. Over the next seven years, the average matu-
rity trended down as the Desk purchased more Trea-
sury bills than Treasury coupon issues on balance.7
By the end of 1991, the average maturity of the
portfolio was just under three years.
In the spring of 1992, the FOMC reviewed the
maturity structure of the Federal Reserve’s portfolio
holdings. It concluded that the portfolio was sufﬁ-
ciently liquid and directed the Desk to take steps to
keep the average maturity from falling further. Fol-
lowing a further review in September 1996, the
FOMC conﬁrmed its view that the primary objective
in managing the composition of the Federal Reserve’s
domestic securities portfolio was to ensure a high
degree of liquidity.
Counterparties
The FOMC’s authorization to conduct open market
operations permits the Desk to conduct business with
foreign ofﬁcial and international institutions that
maintain accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York and with securities dealers. The dealers
with which the Desk transacts business are called
primary dealers. For many years, primary dealers
were expected to meet market share and capital
requirements, to bid meaningfully for new securities
at U.S. Treasury auctions, and to permit review of
their dealer activities by the Federal Reserve through
statistical and ﬁnancial reporting and on-site visits.8
In addition to being invited to bid in open market
operations, primary dealers, unlike other dealers,
were allowed to bid on behalf of customers at all
Treasury auctions and to bid at Treasury note and
bond auctions without ﬁrst making a deposit or
obtaining a guarantee. The practice of transacting
with a limited number of dealers was intended to
foster the development of active and liquid secondary
markets for Treasury debt, to promote vigorous bid-
ding at Treasury auctions, and to ensure that the
Federal Reserve had counterparties who could handle
its large orders efﬁciently and safely.
In 1991, following disclosures of bidding irregu-
larities at Treasury auctions by Salomon Brothers,
Inc., the Treasury, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, and the Federal Reserve reviewed many
aspects of the market for Treasury securities, includ-
7. The notable exception in this downtrend occurred in 1989, when
the average maturity ticked up. Heavy purchases of foreign currency
by the Federal Reserve injected more reserve balances into the deposi-
tory system than were consistent with reserve objectives, and the Desk
absorbed the overabundance through sales of Treasury bills.
8. See also ‘‘Monetary Policy and Open Market Operations during
1991,’’ Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, vol. 17
(Spring 1992), pp. 1–24.
1. Federal Reserve holdings of U.S. Treasury and federal
agency securities, September 24, 1997
Billions of dollars
Type of security Holding
Treasury bills1 ...................................... 209.6
Treasury coupon securities ........................... 216.5
Notes ............................................. 161.5
Bonds ............................................ 55.0
Federal agency ...................................... .9
Total Treasury and agency ........................... 427.0
1. Includes Treasury bills sold under matched sale–purchase transactions.







1975 ................. 31 29
1980 ................. 54 45
1985 ................. 47 60
1990 ................. 39 71
1991 ................. 35 72
1992 ................. 36 70
1993 ................. 38 68
1994 ................. 38 66
1995 ................. 39 63
1996 ................. 41 63
1997 ................. 42 64
Note. End-of-year data except 1997; for 1997, end-of-June data. Federal
Reserve holdings exclude the effects of securities acquired and sold in
temporary transactions.
Source. Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Treasury Bulletin.
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the Federal Reserve to establish a more open system
of trading relationships based primarily on the
value of the dealers as counterparties for the Federal
Reserve and the Treasury. The Federal Reserve
dropped the market share criterion, which was
viewed by some market participants as a barrier, and
discontinued its dealer surveillance function, in part
to emphasize that the Federal Reserve does not regu-
late primary dealers. As it always has, the Federal
Reserve does require that primary dealers be active
and competitive participants in open market opera-
tions and that they be consistent and meaningful
participants in Treasury auctions. It also requires that
primary dealers meet the capital standards of their
primary regulators rather than a standard set by the
Federal Reserve. In addition, primary dealers must
freely and candidly supply the Desk with information
on market activity. The joint agency review also
prompted the Treasury to change its auction proce-
dures, extending to other dealers the privileges once
enjoyed only by primary dealers. The number of
primary dealers currently is close to its 1991 level:
Some dealers have been added to the list, while a few
have either exited the business or merged with other
primary dealers.
THE DAILY CONDUCT
OF OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS
Each morning, the staff at the Domestic Trading
Desk decide whether an open market operation is
necessary and, if so, whether it should be an outright
or a temporary operation.
Determining the Need for an Operation
Staff at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and at
the Board of Governors provide the Desk with esti-
mates of the average supply of and demand for
reserves for the current two-week reserve mainte-
nance period (and two future periods), along with the
daily estimates that underlie the averages for the
current period. The estimates of period-average
reserve demand, less an allowance for discount win-
9. The ﬁndings of the review are reported in Joint Report on the
Government Securities Market (Washington, D.C.: Government Print-
ing Ofﬁce, January 1992).
Estimating the Need for Open Market Operations
The ﬁrst step in estimating the need for open market opera-
tions is constructing the nonborrowed reserve objective.
Rearranging the equation that deﬁnes reserve concepts,
NBR = RR + ER - BR.
The demand for required reserves (RR) is estimated by staff
at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and at the Board
of Governors on the basis of data on deposits reported by
depository institutions. The Desk assumes that the demand
for excess reserves (ER) will be $1 billion, but it sometimes
adjusts that ﬁgure as the maintenance period progresses on
the basis of econometric models and data on holdings of
excess reserves by type of depository institution (for exam-
ple, large banks, small banks, thrift institutions, and U.S.
branches of foreign banks). The supply of borrowed
reserves (BR) is estimated by the Desk as the amount of
reserve balances to be supplied through the discount
window that is consistent with the difference between the
discount rate and the FOMC’s target federal funds rate.
Most discount window borrowing is done under the sea-
sonal program, and the interest rate charged is a ﬂoating,
market-based rate; such borrowing rises in the spring (as
loans are extended during the planting season), peaks in the
summer, and tapers off in the fall (as loans are repaid after
the harvest). Once these three estimates are available, the
equation is used to construct the nonborrowed reserve
objective. For example, if required reserves are estimated at
$47.5 billion, the demand for excess reserves is assumed
to be $1 billion, and borrowed reserves are estimated at
$0.4 billion, then the nonborrowed reserve objective for the
period is $48.1 billion.
The second step is forecasting the supply of nonborrowed
reserves in the absence of any additional open market
operations over the remainder of the maintenance period.
These forecasts, which are provided to the Desk by staff at
the New York Reserve Bank and the Board, include an
estimate of the amount of vault cash that depository institu-
tions will use to meet their reserve requirements.
The amount of reserve balances that must be added or
drained through open market operations each day, on aver-
age, over the entire reserve maintenance period is the differ-
ence between the nonborrowed reserve objective and the
projected supply of nonborrowed reserves. If the projected
supply exceeds the objective, the Desk must drain reserve
balances during the period. If the objective exceeds the
projected supply, the Desk must add reserve balances; for
example, if the staff estimates that the supply of nonbor-
rowed reserves is $44.1 billion for the period and the
objective is $48.1 billion, then the Desk needs to add a daily
average of $4 billion over the maintenance period.
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target, yield an objective for nonborrowed reserves.
(See box ‘‘Estimating the Need for Open Market
Operations.’’) This objective is modiﬁed as the main-
tenance period progresses to incorporate new infor-
mation on reserve demand or borrowing. The objec-
tive is compared with the projected supply of
nonborrowed reserves absent any additional open
market operations during the maintenance period.
The difference between the objective and the pro-
jected supply indicates the amount of reserve bal-
ances that must be added or drained each day, on
average, over the entire maintenance period: If the
objective for nonborrowed reserves exceeds the pro-
jected supply, the Desk needs to add reserve bal-
ances; if the projected supply of nonborrowed
reserves exceeds the objective, the Desk needs to
drain reserve balances. The points during the main-
tenance period at which reserve balances are added or
drained and the types of operations conducted depend
importantly on the expected duration and daily pat-
tern of the reserve need.
Outright Operations
If staff projections indicate a large and persistent
imbalance between reserve demand and supply, say
for a month or more, the Desk may conduct an
outright purchase or sale of securities. (See box
‘‘Types of Open Market Operations.’’) Such transac-
tions increase or decrease the size of the Federal
Reserve’s portfolio (and thus add or drain reserve
balances) permanently. The Desk conducts far more
outright purchases than outright sales, primarily
because it must offset the reserve drain resulting from
the public’s increasing demand for currency.
Before 1995, the Desk entered the market to con-
duct outright operations only a few times each year. It
would wait until reserve needs were large enough
to warrant a sizable transaction—on the order of
$3 billion to $4 billion—in part because such opera-
tions, especially coupon purchases, were time con-
suming. For a coupon purchase, for example, the
Desk had to review numerous offers on about two
hundred securities. (The number and volume of out-
right purchases in recent years are shown in table 3.)
Automation of the bidding process in 1994 decreased
the time needed to evaluate offers, but dealers still
had to wait a signiﬁcant amount of time between
submitting offers and learning whether their offers
had been accepted. For that reason, dealers, in pricing
their offers, took into account the risk that mar-
ket prices might move adversely while they were
waiting. In November 1995, the Desk changed its
approach to outright coupon purchases. It now
divides up a purchase of coupon securities, focusing
on only a portion of the maturity spectrum rather than
on all maturities at once. This approach has further
decreased the turnaround time for such operations
and has likely resulted in better prices to the Desk.
The Desk still purchases all maturities of Treasury
coupon issues, but it generally spreads its purchases
over several weeks, in keeping with the size of esti-
mated reserve needs. With this new procedure, the
Desk is better able to tailor its purchases to reserve
needs. In addition, the operations, which had been
conducted only in the early afternoon, can now be
conducted in the morning as well.
Temporary Operations
If staff projections indicate only a short-lived need
to add or drain reserve balances, the Desk usually
conducts a temporary operation. Such operations are
far more common than outright operations, partly
because daily ﬂuctuations in technical factors alter
reserve supply (as discussed in the box ‘‘Reserve
Concepts, Technical Factors, and Required Clearing
Balances’’). The daily demand for reserves is gener-
ally assumed to be equal to the period-average level,
but the ﬁgure is informally adjusted on days on
which reserve demand has historically appeared to be
elevated, such as on days on which social security
payments are made. Although reserves are held on a
two-week average basis, a large imbalance between
demand and supply on any one day may cause the
federal funds rate to move signiﬁcantly away from
the FOMC’s target. Temporary open market opera-
tions help to offset such large daily imbalances. The
Desk arranges repurchase agreements to add reserve
balances temporarily and matched sale–purchase
transactions to drain reserve balances temporarily.
3. Outright purchases in the market, 1990–97
Year











1990 ....... 5 16.6 0 . . .
1991 ....... 3 8.1 1 2.3
1992 ....... 3 9.7 3 12.3
1993 ....... 2 8.6 4 16.8
1994 ....... 2 7.7 4 17.0
1995 ....... 2 8.2 5 9.1
1996 ....... 2 9.8 5 7.2
1997 ....... 1 4.0 13 17.4
Note. Data for 1997 are through September 24.
Open Market Operations in the 1990s 865For more than seventeen years, the Desk entered
the market to arrange temporary transactions between
11:30 a.m. and 11:45 a.m. This time was selected
because it gave staff members at the Board and the
New York Reserve Bank time at the beginning of the
business day to assemble data on factors affecting
reserve supply and demand and to make their fore-
casts. Although the market for repurchase agreements
was somewhat more active earlier in the day, it was
usually sufﬁciently active at this time to accommo-
date open market operations. Nonetheless, there was
a risk that the volume of offers on the operation
would not be sufﬁcient to allow the Desk to inject the
desired amount of reserve balances into the deposi-
Types of Open Market Operations
Most open market operations are conducted in the market
with the thirty-nine securities dealers that are designated
‘‘primary dealers;’’ some are conducted with foreign ofﬁcial
and international institutions that maintain accounts at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. All operations in the
market are conducted as auctions, with all primary dealers
invited to bid, and the bidding and bid evaluation processes
are now automated. Since January 1997, the Desk has
reported the par value of each of its open market operations
with primary dealers at the conclusion of the operation.
Outright Operations
The Desk may not add to the Federal Reserve’s holdings of
securities by purchasing new securities when they are ﬁrst
auctioned because it has no authority to lend directly to the
Treasury.1 Therefore, it must make any additions to hold-
ings through purchases from primary dealers in the second-
ary market or directly from foreign ofﬁcial and international
institutions.
Purchases and Sales in the Market. When purchasing or
selling securities in the secondary market, the Desk enter-
tains from primary dealers bids on all securities of a particu-
lar type (Treasury bills or Treasury coupon securities) and,
for coupon securities, in a particular portion of the maturity
spectrum. In determining which bids to accept, the Desk
considers the bids that represent the highest yield (for
purchases) or the lowest yield (for sales) relative to the
prevailing yield curve. To avoid holding too large a share of
any one issue, the Desk also considers the size of its
holdings of the particular issue relative to the total amount
outstanding.
Outright sales in the market are infrequent; the most
recent one occurred in 1990. For many years, the Desk
often sold Treasury bills in late January to absorb a surfeit
of reserves resulting from seasonal declines in currency
outstanding and in required reserves. In the 1990s, strong
overseas demand for U.S. currency generally has offset the
seasonal decline in currency outstanding, obviating the need
for outright sales.
1. It may exchange its maturing holdings for new securities at auction,
however, and it does so routinely.
Purchases from and Sales to Foreign and International
Accounts. Purchases from and sales to foreign and interna-
tional accounts enable the Desk to make small adjustments
to the Federal Reserve’s securities holdings without for-
mally entering the market.2 Purchases from these accounts
were fairly common until 1996, when the Desk decided to
make most of its purchases in the secondary market from
primary dealers so that its operations would be more trans-
parent. Also, the recent shift to purchasing securities in the
market in a particular portion of the maturity spectrum has
given the Desk the ﬂexibility to add to the Federal Reserve’s
portfolio more gradually, thus reducing the need to rely on
transactions with foreign and international accounts for this
purpose. Sales to these accounts have been infrequent in the
1990s because of the strong demand for currency. The sizes
of purchases from and sales to foreign and international
accounts are not explicitly reported to the public, though
they can be inferred from changes in the Federal Reserve’s
holdings of domestic securities.3
Redemptions. The Desk can choose to reduce the size of
the Federal Reserve’s holdings by redeeming some of its
maturing securities rather than exchanging all of them for
new securities. Such an approach makes it possible to
reduce the portfolio gradually without formally entering the
market. When replacement securities are not available, the
Desk must redeem its maturing holdings.
Temporary Operations
An operation is temporary if the transaction will, under the
contract, unwind after a speciﬁed number of days. Tempo-
rary open market operations help to offset short-lived imbal-
ances between reserve supply and demand. The Desk
arranges repurchase agreements to add reserve balances
temporarily and matched sale–purchase transactions to drain
reserve balances temporarily.
2. The price at which these transactions occur is the midpoint between the
bid and the ask price in the secondary market.
3. Federal Reserve statistical release H.4.1, Factors Affecting Reserve
Balances of Depository Institutions and Condition Statement of F.R. Banks,
which is published each Thursday, provides data on the Federal Reserve’s
domestic securities portfolio and other factors affecting the reserve balances
of depository institutions. These data are also provided monthly in tables
1.11 and 1.18 of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
866 Federal Reserve Bulletin November 1997tory system, particularly when reserve needs were
large. At times when the risk was high, the Desk
might enter the market before its customary interven-
tion time or might preannounce the operation on the
preceding afternoon to try to ensure that the volume
of offers would be adequate.
Types of Open Market Operations—Continued
Repurchase Agreements
When the Desk arranges a repurchase agreement, it pur-
chases securities from a primary dealer (or the dealer’s
customer) and agrees to resell the securities to the dealer (or
customer) on a speciﬁed date. The Desk arranges two types
of repurchase agreements: System and customer-related.
For both types, the Desk solicits offers from primary deal-
ers. The dealers may make offers on their own behalf or on
behalf of their customers. The offers set forth a rate and an
amount of repurchase agreements that the dealer (or its
customer) is prepared to transact.4 The Desk ranks the bids
in descending order of rate. It accepts the offer with the
highest rate ﬁrst and continues to accept lower rates until
the total volume of offers equals the amount of reserve
balances that the Desk wants to inject into the depository
system. If a greater quantity is offered at the lowest rate
than is needed to attain the desired quantity, the offers at
that rate are prorated.
System Repurchase Agreements. The Desk does not
announce the intended size of the operation when it solicits
offers. The dealer (or customer) whose offer is accepted
sends securities (Treasury or federal agency) to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, and the Bank pays for them by
creating balances in the Federal Reserve account of the
dealer’s (or the dealer’s customer’s) clearing bank.
System repurchase agreements are conducted on an over-
night or term basis. Term repurchase agreements may last
no longer than ﬁfteen days and may be either withdrawable
or ﬁxed term. If the agreement is withdrawable, the dealer
has the option of asking, before 10:00 a.m. on any day
before the agreement concludes, for the return of its securi-
ties; it usually does so if ﬁnancing rates fall below the rate
arranged with the Desk. If the repurchase agreement is ﬁxed
term, the dealer may not withdraw its securities early.
Until February 1994, when the FOMC began announcing
changes in its policy stance, overnight System repurchase
agreements were often used to signal an easing of monetary
policy. Term System repurchase agreements, in contrast,
were considered more technical, though the Desk generally
refrained from such operations when the federal funds rate
was noticeably below the FOMC’s target, so as not to
mislead market participants about the stance of policy.
Customer-Related Repurchase Agreements. Customer-
related repurchase agreements are a type of transaction
4. The price at which the Federal Reserve temporarily purchases the
securities is that day’s market price. This price and the rate quoted by the
dealer determine the price at which the Federal Reserve resells the securities.
arranged by the Desk with primary dealers on behalf of
foreign ofﬁcial and international institutions that maintain
accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
These institutions maintain accounts at the New York
Reserve Bank to help manage their U.S. dollar payments
and receipts. The Federal Reserve provides a means by
which the cash balances in these accounts can be invested
overnight. The accounts purchase securities from the Fed-
eral Reserve’s portfolio and simultaneously agree to resell
the securities the next business day at prices that give the
accounts a market-based rate of return. Reserve balances
are drained when balances in these accounts rise. When the
Desk wants to replenish reserve levels, it may decide to
pass these accounts’ purchase requests through to primary
dealers as customer-related repurchase agreements.
Customer-related repurchase agreements were ﬁrst used
in 1974 and were quite common until recently. In December
1996, the Desk announced that it would no longer routinely
conduct these operations, and it did not conduct any over
the ﬁrst nine months of 1997. When the Desk did conduct
these transactions, it announced the intended size of the
operation to dealers but usually did not report the ﬁnal
accepted amount. The operations were generally smaller
than operations involving System repurchase agreements;
the maximum size was limited by the volume of purchase
requests. The maturity of these agreements was generally
overnight because participation in the investment facility
changed each day. These operations were viewed as techni-
cal in nature and as a signal of satisfaction with the level of
the federal funds rate.
Matched Sale–Purchase Transactions
Matched sale–purchase transactions (which are akin to
reverse repurchase agreements) are the method by which
the Federal Reserve drains reserve balances temporarily.
They were ﬁrst used in 1966. In these transactions, the
Federal Reserve agrees to sell a short-dated Treasury bill at
a speciﬁed price, and the buyer simultaneously enters into
another agreement to sell the bill back to the Federal
Reserve on a speciﬁc date.
In a matched sale–purchase transaction, the Desk indi-
cates the bill and the rate at which it will sell the bill.
Dealers then submit offers for the amount of the bill they
will buy and the rate at which they will resell it to the Desk.
The Desk accepts the highest rate ﬁrst (so that it buys back
the bill at the lowest price) and continues to accept lower
rates until the total of accepted offers equals the amount of
reserve balances that it wants to drain.
Open Market Operations in the 1990s 867In 1994, the Federal Reserve began charging a fee
for daylight overdrafts in depository institutions’ Fed-
eral Reserve accounts.10 Securities dealers, who now
faced fees on the daylight overdrafts in their accounts
with depository institutions, began arranging and set-
tling more of their ﬁnancing transactions earlier in
the day to reduce their daylight overdrafts. The Desk,
in turn, sought to align its market entry more closely
with the period of greatest market activity, and
in January 1997, after an acceleration of Federal
Reserve data ﬂows and modiﬁcations to processing
procedures, it moved its intervention time to around
10:30 a.m.
Shifts in the short-run target for open market opera-
tions have inﬂuenced the number of times the Desk
enters the market each day to conduct temporary
transactions and the role of reserve estimates in deter-
mining the amount of reserve balances to be sup-
plied. In the 1970s, when the target was the federal
funds rate, the Desk frequently entered the market
several times a day. Although reserve estimates gen-
erally guided decisions about the quantity of reserve
balances to be supplied, the Desk responded to any
deviation of the federal funds rate from target, regard-
less of the reserve estimates, up until its intervention
window closed in the early afternoon. During the
1979–82 period, when the target was nonborrowed
reserves, the Desk entered the market at most once a
day. Estimates of reserve supply and demand were
essential in determining the quantity of reserve bal-
ances to be supplied. At the time of this single market
entry, the Desk typically conducted only one opera-
tion, although at times it conducted two operations
with different terms, such as four- and seven-day
repurchase agreements. Since late 1982, as proce-
dures have evolved and the federal funds rate again
has become the short-run target for open market
operations, the Desk has continued, generally, to enter
the market at most once a day to conduct temporary
transactions, and at times to conduct two operations
with different terms. Estimates of reserve supply and
demand continue to play a role in determining the
amount of reserve balances to supply in order to keep
the federal funds rate close to the FOMC’s target
level. It is possible that the Desk will enter the market
several times on any given day when reserve needs
warrant, but multiple market entries are not expected
to become routine. The Desk entered the market
more than once to arrange repurchase agreements on
only two days in the ﬁrst nine months of 1997.
CHANGES IN THE DEMAND FOR BALANCES
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Innovations in the 1990s have reduced required
reserve balances. Although depository institutions
have increased the amount of balances they contract
to hold in the form of required clearing balances,
total required balances have dropped to historically
low levels. This development has implications for the
conduct of open market operations and for the federal
funds rate.
High Total Required Balances
Until the early 1990s, depository institution demand
for balances at the Federal Reserve was high and
relatively stable. This environment facilitated the
conduct of open market operations. High required
reserves created a stable, predictable demand for
reserve balances, so the Desk could more readily
achieve the FOMC’s reserve market objective by
manipulating the supply of reserve balances. More-
over, high required reserve balances and the averag-
ing method used to satisfy them allowed depository
institutions to manage their daily account balances
ﬂexibly, thus helping to smooth the federal funds
rate.11
The size of the balance that a depository institution
wants to hold at the end of the day in most cases is
either its required reserve balance (plus perhaps a
desired amount of excess reserves) or the balance it
chooses to hold to protect itself against unanticipated
debits that could leave its account overdrawn at
the end of the day—its payment-related demand.
When required reserve balances are high relative to
payment-related balances, depository institutions
have a great deal of ﬂexibility in managing their daily
account balances because they can substitute a bal-
ance held on one day for a balance held on another
day.12 A depository institution that ﬁnds its balance at
the Federal Reserve unexpectedly high on one day
(for instance, because a customer made an unex-
pected deposit or an expected payment was not made)
10. For a discussion of the reasons for the Federal Reserve’s
imposition of fees for daylight overdrafts and the response to these
fees, see Heidi Willmann Richards, ‘‘Daylight Overdraft Fees and the
Federal Reserve’s Payment System Risk Policy,’’ Federal Reserve
Bulletin, vol. 81 (December 1995), pp. 1065–77.
11. A depository institution’s required reserve balance is the differ-
ence between its required reserves and its applied vault cash.
12. The degree of substitutability is more limited on the ﬁnal day
of the maintenance period because reserve carryover rules control the
extent to which deﬁcient or excess balances may be carried into the
next maintenance period.
868 Federal Reserve Bulletin November 1997does not have to offer to lend the extra balance at
very low rates; it can absorb the surplus by choosing
to hold lower balances over the remainder of the
period and still meet its balance requirement.13 Hold-
ing a lower balance on a subsequent day of the period
does not necessarily increase the likelihood that the
depository institution will incur an overnight over-
draft because its targeted balance is still high relative
to its payment-related demand for balances. This
ﬂexibility in managing account balances buffers
variations in reserve demand and supply that would
otherwise put pressure on the federal funds rate.
Before the early 1990s, the demand for balances
to meet reserve requirements was well above the
payment-related demand for balances. Imbalances
between the daily supply of and demand for reserves
could be relatively sizable without affecting the
federal funds rate as long as cumulative-average bal-
ances were close to period-average requirements. For
example, unexpected deviations of reserve supply
from projections generally did not create volatility in




In recent years, the level of required reserve balances
has been trending down (chart 1, top panel), for
several reasons.
Cuts in Reserve Requirement Ratios
In the early 1990s, sharp declines in required reserve
balances followed two cuts in reserve requirement
ratios by the Federal Reserve:14 In December 1990,
the ratio for nontransaction deposits was reduced
from 3 percent to zero, and in April 1992, the ratio
for transaction deposits was reduced from 12 percent
to 10 percent.15 The cuts had little effect on the
amount of vault cash held by depository institutions,
which depends largely on customer needs for cur-
rency, so most of the reductions in required reserves
were reﬂected in lower required reserve balances.
Each of the cuts trimmed required reserve balances
about one-third.
13. A depository institution’s end-of-day balances during a reserve
maintenance period must at least average its balance requirement, and
any deﬁciency may be subject to a charge. The charge is 2 percentage
points above the lowest discount rate in effect for borrowing from its
Federal Reserve Bank on the ﬁrst day of the month in which the
deﬁciency occurred. Reserve carryover rules permit the depository
institution to carry over a deﬁciency (or surplus) of up to 4 percent of
its required reserves into the next maintenance period. Any deﬁciency
that cannot be carried over is subject to charge immediately. If the
depository institution fails to cover the deﬁciency that was carried
over to the subsequent period, the deﬁciency charge applies to that
portion as well.
14. The subsequent rebounds in these balances reﬂected strong
growth in transaction deposits due in part to falling market interest
rates.
15. The reasons these cuts were made and their implications are
discussed in Feinman, ‘‘Reserve Requirements: History, Current Prac-
tice, and Potential Reform.’’
1. Required balances at Federal Reserve Banks, 1984–97



















Note. Maintenance-period averages, not seasonally adjusted; 1997 data
through September 24.
Open Market Operations in the 1990s 869Initiation of Retail Sweep Programs
More recently, depository institutions have reduced
the amount of balances they must hold at the Federal
Reserve by instituting retail sweep programs. Under
such a program, a depository institution shifts funds
from a depositor’s reservable transaction deposit (a
checking account) to that depositor’s nonreservable
account (in most cases a money market deposit
account). (See box ‘‘Retail Sweep Programs.’’) By
doing so, the depository institution decreases the
level of its deposits subject to reserve requirements
and, with no change in its vault cash holdings, its
required reserve balance, on which it earns no inter-
est. A sweep program is proﬁtable because the
depository institution can invest the balances for-
merly held as reserves in interest-earning assets.
Retail sweep programs were ﬁrst implemented
in January 1994, and since then they have spread to
most large depository institutions. The total amount
of reservable deposits initially swept under such
programs reached an estimated $226 billion in
August 1997.16 As a consequence, required reserves
declined nearly $21 billion, or one-third, between
December 1993 and August 1997. Sweep programs
lower the balance a depository institution must hold
to meet its reserve requirement; in some cases, they
lower the required reserve balance so much that it
falls to zero because the depository institution’s vault
cash is more than sufﬁcient to satisfy its reserve
requirement. In the aggregate, required reserve bal-
ances dropped nearly $20 billion, or 70 percent,
between December 1993 and August 1997.
The Response of Required Clearing Balances
For many depository institutions, the cuts in reserve
requirement ratios and the introduction of sweep
programs have brought their reserve-requirement-
related demands for balances below their payment-
related demands. For such an institution, setting a
target end-of-day balance equal only to its required
reserve balance would provide insufﬁcient protection
against overnight overdrafts, yet setting a target bal-
ance equal to its payment-related demand would
result in excess reserves, on which it earns no inter-
est. The institution may have another alternative:
Any depository institution that uses Federal Reserve
priced services (such as check clearing or electronic
payment services) may establish a required clearing
balance at its Federal Reserve Bank. The institution
contracts with the Reserve Bank to hold a speciﬁed
level of balances on average during the reserve main-
tenance period.17 In return, the depository institution
earns implicit interest, in the form of earnings credits,
on balances held to satisfy its clearing balance
requirement. It may use the earnings credits to defray
the cost of the Federal Reserve services it uses. If the
depository institution fails to maintain its contracted
clearing balance, on average, over the maintenance
16. The Federal Reserve does not collect data on the actual amount
of deposits swept each day. Nor does it ofﬁcially collect information
on the initiation of retail sweep programs. It learns about the initiation
of programs through notiﬁcation by depository institutions and
through routine inspection of deposit data submitted by depository
institutions. It obtains estimates of initial amounts swept directly from
the depository institutions or from the deposit data and then sums
these estimates to arrive at a total.
17. The Federal Reserve will also impose a required clearing
balance on any depository institution that has a history of repeated
overnight overdrafts.
Retail Sweep Programs
In a retail sweep program, a depository institution sweeps
amounts above a predetermined maximum level from a
depositor’s checking account (either a demand deposit or
an interest-bearing checking account) into a special-
purpose money market deposit account (MMDA) created
for the depositor. If the balance in the checking account
falls below some minimum level, funds are moved from
the MMDA back into the checking account to bring the
checking account balance to the speciﬁed maximum
level. The maximum and minimum levels are set by the
depository institution on the basis of the depositor’s
pattern of activity. Regulations limit the number of auto-
matic transfers from an MMDA to six a month, so upon
the sixth transfer the remaining funds in the depositor’s
MMDA are swept back into the checking account.
Retail sweep programs, which were initiated in Janu-
ary 1994, differ from wholesale sweep programs, which
have been in existence since the 1970s. In a wholesale
sweep, a depository institution sweeps funds in a busi-
ness’s demand deposit account into one of several types
of money market instruments, such as repurchase agree-
ments, Eurodollar deposits, or money market mutual
funds. For wholesale sweeps, the instruments into which
business deposits are swept may or may not be liabilities
of the depository institution; for retail sweeps, on the
other hand, the swept funds remain on the books of the
depository institution.
870 Federal Reserve Bulletin November 1997period, the deﬁciency is subject to a charge.18 Re-
quired clearing balances are similar to required
reserve balances in that they establish an average
balance that must be maintained over the reserve
maintenance period. For this reason, required clear-
ing and required reserve balances are often summed,
and that sum is referred to as total required balances.
The use of required clearing balances has grown
considerably since 1990 (chart 1, middle panel).
These balances rose sharply in response to the 1990
cut in reserve requirement ratios and the general
downtrend in market interest rates occurring at that
time.19 More recently, depository institutions that
implemented sweep programs increased their
required clearing balances an estimated $31⁄3 billion
between January 1994 and August 1997. The rise in
required clearing balances has not matched the
decline in required reserve balances, however, in part
because depository institutions do not need as large a
cushion to protect against overnight overdrafts as was
once provided by their required reserve balance.
Also, the growth of required clearing balances at
some depository institutions is limited by the extent
to which the institution uses Federal Reserve priced
services.20 Thus, the drop in total required balances at
the Federal Reserve is smaller than the decline in
required reserve balances. However, total required
balances remain at historically low levels (chart 1,
bottom panel) and are likely to decline somewhat
further as additional depository institutions imple-
ment retail sweep programs.
The Current Environment:
Low Total Required Balances
Low total required balances give depository institu-
tions less ﬂexibility in managing their daily balance
positions and thus do not provide a buffer for the
federal funds rate as high total required balances do.
When its total required balance is low, a depository
institution is less able to substitute balances across
days of the maintenance period. It is less likely to
hold a balance above its total required balance
because its ability to target lower balances on subse-
quent days is constrained by the increased risk of an
overnight overdraft; therefore, it will actively seek to
lend any extra balances, on which it earns no interest,
even if the funds rate is already low. It is also less
likely to tolerate a balance below its total required
balance because it is more likely to be close to an
overdraft; therefore, it will seek to borrow balances,
and even a small shortfall can trigger aggressive
bidding for balances at the Federal Reserve that can,
in turn, push up the federal funds rate.21
In addition, when a depository institution’s total
required balance is low, its targeted balance at the
Federal Reserve is likely to ﬂuctuate more from day
to day. Its payment-related demand for balances may
more often exceed its demand for balances to meet its
total balance requirement. Payment-related demand
is a precautionary demand for end-of-day balances
that must be met each day, and the magnitude of that
demand depends on the uncertainty about the size
and timing of payments ﬂowing through the insti-
tution’s Federal Reserve account.22 The uncertainty
appears to be related to the volume of the payments.
This volume likely ﬂuctuates considerably each day,
as suggested by the aggregate data shown in chart 2.
With uncertainty varying from one day to the next, a
depository institution’s payment-related demand and
18. The penalty for failing to meet the required clearing balance,
after application of the so-called clearing balance band, is 2 percent
per annum on any deﬁcient amount that is 20 percent or less than the
contracted clearing balance requirement and 4 percent per annum on
any remaining deﬁciency. The clearing balance band exempts from
charge 2 percent of the contracted clearing balance or $25,000,
whichever is greater.
19. Required clearing balances are sensitive to the level of interest
rates because the earnings credits generated from the clearing balance
are calculated using the period-average effective federal funds rate.
For a more detailed discussion of required clearing balances, see E.J.
Stevens, ‘‘Required Clearing Balances,’’ Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland Economic Review, vol. 29 (1993 Quarter 4), pp. 1–14.
20. A depository institution is better off holding excess reserves,
which can be adjusted daily, than contracting to hold a required
clearing balance that generates more credits than it can use. The
opportunity cost of holding excess reserves and excess clearing bal-
ances is the interest forgone on those balances, but the clearing
balance locks the depository institution into holding a speciﬁed
amount during the maintenance period and makes any deﬁciency
subject to a charge. Depository institutions have one year to use the
credits earned during a maintenance period.
21. An overnight overdraft is charged at an annual rate equal to the
day’s effective federal funds rate plus 4 percentage points. If the
depository institution incurs more than three overnight overdrafts in a
moving twelve-month period, the spread over the funds rate rises by
1 percentage point for each additional overdraft.
22. At the end of the day, depository institutions still face some
uncertainty about their ﬁnal balance. Responses to the Federal
Reserve’s May 1996 Senior Financial Ofﬁcer Survey indicated that
the posting of off-line transactions after the close of the electronic
funds transfer system and the possibility that corrections to earlier
entries might result in a lower balance were very important reasons for
not targeting a lower end-of-day balance in their Federal Reserve
accounts.
Open Market Operations in the 1990s 871its targeted balance at the Federal Reserve can vary
substantially each day as well.
Implications for Open Market Operations
The Desk attempts to attain a level of nonborrowed
reserves over a reserve maintenance period that is
consistent with the FOMC’s targeted federal funds
rate. When planning open market operations, it has
always paid attention to the daily pattern of reserve
needs. Now, with total required balances low, the
daily estimates are playing an even more important
role in decisionmaking. The Desk now also reviews
forecasts of the total amount of balances at the Fed-
eral Reserve for the day and for future days. During
maintenance periods when total required balances are
especially low, the Desk conducts open market opera-
tions to smooth low points in the estimated daily
level of total balances. In addition, as it always has, it
attempts to supply more reserve balances on days
when the payment-related demand for balances is
expected to be elevated. These additional consider-
ations have resulted in an increase in the number and
volume of overnight repurchase agreements arranged
in 1996 and thus far in 1997 (table 4).23 An overnight
operation is a more effective means of ﬁne tuning the
daily level of balances than is a term or outright
operation and better addresses heightened payment-
related demands.
There is indirect evidence that on certain days
payment-related demand is an especially important
determinant of the total demand for balances at the
Federal Reserve. Data on credits posted to the Fed-
eral Reserve accounts of depository institutions sug-
gest that payment ﬂows are heaviest on the ﬁrst
business day, the ﬁfteenth calendar day, and the last
business day of the month. On these days, depository
institutions face more uncertainty about their end-of-
day balances. Some depository institutions respond
by targeting a higher balance. The Desk seeks to
provide balances more generously on these days.
However, the exact magnitude of payment-related
demand is hard to measure and to estimate. More-
over, even if it were to supply a quantity of balances
that exactly matched aggregate demand, the Desk
could not ensure that the supply to each institution
would exactly match its demand. For these reasons,
the federal funds rate may exceed the FOMC’s target
on these days. Generally, however, the Desk is able to
keep the effective federal funds rate (the volume-
weighted average rate paid on all transactions during
the day) close to the FOMC’s target rate.
23. An overnight operation matures on the next business day. The
increased use of overnight repurchase agreements is also discussed in
‘‘Open Market Operations during 1996,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin,
vol. 83 (July 1997), pp. 565–74.
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1990 .. 93 253.5 34 136.4 22 76.8
1991 .. 108 320.2 34 188.5 34 78.8
1992 .. 89 254.5 56 278.9 20 28.6
1993 .. 83 266.7 82 361.0 5 10.9
1994 .. 80 217.6 66 257.1 5 13.1
1995 .. 68 206.3 61 248.8 17 48.6
1996 .. 92 347.5 70 250.3 23 52.9
1997 .. 91 351.5 59 296.5 0 . . .
Note. Data for 1997 are through September 24.
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Low total required balances, together with the difﬁ-
culty of gauging the size of payment-related demand,
can lead to greater volatility in the federal funds rate,
both during a day and across days.24 For example,
the 1990 cut in reserve requirement ratios brought
required reserve balances below the payment-related
demand for balances, and funds rate volatility rose
signiﬁcantly(chart3).Thetimebetweentheannounce-
ment and implementation of the cut was quite short.
Many large depository institutions had no experience
managing their end-of-day balances at the Federal
Reserve with total required balances as low as they
were after the cut. Depository institutions responded
by holding on to their balances until late in the day,
when their need for balances to avoid an overnight
overdraft became clearer. The funds rate would
remain above the FOMC’s target until that time, and
then, when depository institutions entered the market
to try to lend their excess balances, it would drop
sharply. At the same time, the acute reluctance of
depository institutions to borrow at the discount win-
dow also contributed to the volatility. On days when
balances were in short supply, depository institutions
bid the funds rate to very high levels rather than
borrow at the window.25
The level at which total required balances can
trigger a rise in funds rate volatility is not clear. Since
late 1996, for example, total required balances have
been below their 1991 levels, yet funds rate volatility
has failed to rise signiﬁcantly.26 Apparently, total
required balances are sufﬁciently above the payment-
related demand for balances to keep the funds rate
relatively stable. The payment-related demand for
balances is likely lower now than it was in 1991.
Depository institutions have improved their own
internal information systems as well as their proﬁ-
ciency in using real-time information on the balances
in their Federal Reserve accounts available through
the Federal Reserve’s Account Balance Monitoring
System. In addition, the imposition of fees for day-
light overdrafts has encouraged depository institu-
tions to manage their balances more closely during
the day. In the future, the payment-related demand
for balances may continue to fall. Interstate branch
banking may contribute to lower payment-related
demand because separately chartered afﬁliate banks
of a single bank holding company are being merged
into a single interstate branched bank with one Fed-
24. See James A. Clouse and Douglas W. Elmendorf, ‘‘Declining
Required Reserves and the Volatility of the Federal Funds Rate,’’
Finance and Economics Discussion Series Paper 1997-30 (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Divisions of Research and
Statistics and Monetary Affairs, June 1997). The authors present a
model of a depository institution’s demand for balances that distin-
guishes requirement-related demand from payment-related demand.
They also explore the differing behavior of the funds rate in 1991 and
1996.
25. Some of the bidding pressure also came from depository insti-
tutions that apparently had little or no collateral on deposit with
a Federal Reserve Bank and therefore could not borrow readily.
See ‘‘Monetary Policy and Open Market Operations during 1990,’’
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, vol. 16
(Spring 1991), pp. 52–78.
26. See also Paul Bennett and Spence Hilton, ‘‘Falling Reserve
Balances and the Federal Funds Rate,’’ Federal Reserve Bank of
New York Current Issues in Economics and Finance, vol. 3
(April 1997), pp. 1–6.














Note. Effective rate is the volume-weighted average rate paid on all transactions during the day.
Open Market Operations in the 1990s 873eral Reserve account. Before interstate branching,
each afﬁliate account had to end the day with a
nonnegative balance; under interstate branching, the
transactions of all afﬁliates (now branches) ﬂow
through only one account.
The variability in the federal funds rate in recent
years is summarized in table 5. In 1996, the daily
trading range for federal funds widened, on average,
as did an alternative measure, the intraday standard
deviation of the funds rate. However, both measures
indicate that volatility tapered off during the ﬁrst nine
months of 1997. Overall, the slight increase in the
intraday variability of the funds rate has not had
adverse effects on the Desk’s ability to attain the
FOMC’s funds rate target; nor has the rise in vari-
ability affected other market interest rates more
generally.
Additional sweep programs are expected to be
implemented, and it is not clear whether their prolif-
eration might eventually lower total required bal-
ances to the point that payment-related demand is
routinely larger than requirement-related demand. If
that does happen, the federal funds rate could become
more volatile, and depository institutions may have
to change the way they manage their account bal-
ances. Especially if that volatility is passed on to
other market interest rates, the Federal Reserve might
need to alter the way it operates in the funds market.
One way to forestall the need to make such changes
would be to pay interest on balances held at the
Federal Reserve. Payment of a market rate of interest
on required reserve balances would virtually elimi-
nate the implicit current tax on depository institu-
tions, likely encouraging some depository institutions
to discontinue their sweep programs. However, the
payment of interest on Federal Reserve balances
requires legislation.
SUMMARY
Open market operations are the principal tool used by
the Federal Reserve to implement monetary policy.
They are a powerful and ﬂexible means of fostering
conditions in the federal funds market that are con-
sistent with policy objectives. The conduct of open
market operations in the 1990s has been shaped by a
number of factors, including shifts in the way the
FOMC communicates changes in the stance of mone-
tary policy, developments in the market for repur-
chase agreements, and changes in the demand for
balances at the Federal Reserve. In the years ahead,
the Federal Reserve will undoubtedly continue to
adapt the way it conducts open market operations as
ﬁnancial markets evolve.
5. Daily average volatility of the federal funds rate,
1994–97
Percentage points
Measure 1994 1995 1996 1997
Range ....................... 1.35 1.06 1.87 1.54
Intraday standard deviation ... .19 .15 .23 .19
Late range ................... 1.16 .89 1.56 1.35
Note. Values for 1997 are based on data through September 24. Range is the
difference between the highest and lowest rate at which federal funds lending
took place in the brokers market. Intraday standard deviation is a volume-
weighted standard deviation of all rates paid in the brokers market. Late range
is the difference between the highest and lowest rate at which federal funds
lending took place in the brokers market between the close of the New York
Clearing House Interbank Payments System (usually 4:30 p.m.) and the close of
funds trading (usually 6:30 p.m.)
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